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councillor as a supposedly key link between residents 
and local government, but however not able to play 
his/her role. We contest the dominant vision that the 
failure of participatory democracy in South Africa 
is the consequence of a lack of training, education 
or democratic culture, and we argue that both the 
limited power of ward councillors in Council, and 
the lack of incentive for fostering their accountability 
in front of voters, make local democracy institutions 
dysfunctional. More broadly, we question the lack of 
importance of participatory democracy in the ANC 
and in the government agenda, despite the political 
discourses claiming the contrary.
I. Local participation, a nuisance for 
the Council? “Communities need 
to be radical to be heard”
The public discourse on the importance of local 
democracy and residents’ participation in the 
management of their city has been developing since 
1994, both after the collapse of the apartheid regime 
in which civic organisations played an important role 
– and leave a legacy of locally-based mobilisation and 
thirst for direct democracy; and in the “third wave” 
democratisation process conducted by the State, in 
which the construction of participatory democracy 
is concomitant to the instauration of representative 
democracy. Without going much into the details of 
the legal texts and their intentions2, it is necessary to 
mention the main platforms that have been created 
for local or participatory democracy in South African 
Public discourses emphasise the increasing role 
of ward councillors in service delivery and urban 
policy implementation, as well as underline their 
role as mediators between local government and 
urban residents. Simultaneously, local councillors 
are increasingly the targets of mass urban protests 
(Atkinson, 2006), while being relatively absent from 
the public scene as far as municipal decisions and 
debates are concerned. What can explain this discrep-
ancy? Are ward councillors just “not performing”, not 
willing to play this double role, or still learning what 
their job is about in a new urban governance system? 
Are they mere scapegoats of public discontent in a 
time where government policies shift away from the 
majority’s expectations, or seem to fail, even if good 
intentioned, to address the needs of the poor? We 
rather hypothesise that beyond councillors’ uneven 
personal abilities and levels of commitment, there are 
structural elements that explain this contradiction, 
both in the municipal power structure, the electoral 
system, and local – political and urban – contexts.
This paper1 starts with the study of partici-
pation patterns in different neighbourhoods in 
Johannesburg, and demonstrates that institutional 
channels (be it representative democracy, or various 
participatory institutions and instruments) are 
currently not working in Johannesburg. Be it in low-
income or high-income areas, suburbs or townships, 
residents have to resort to other means, sidelining 
in particular their ward councillor, to be heard. 
We question the reasons for this lack of bottom-
up dialogue, focusing on the figure of the ward 
Local councillors: scapegoats for a 
dysfunctional participatory democratic system?
Lessons from practices of local democracy in Johannesburg
Claire Benit-Gbaffou, Senior Research Specialist, HSRC, URED
1 The research relies on intensive fieldwork in several wards in Johannesburg, through interviews with ward councillors, ward committee 
members, civic leaders, city officials, project managers, and through observation thanks to the attendance of public and committee 
meetings. Wards were chosen to represent different income groups, different political constituencies, and different urban settings.
2 The importance of participation in a “developmental local government” was first developed in the 1998 White Paper on Local government,
followed by several Acts implementing various forms of local democracy: the 1998 Municipal Structures Act and the 2000 Municipal
Systems Act.
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cities (hereafter called “institutional participatory 
channels”). The first platform consists in the election 
of ward councillors, representing local urban territo-
ries3 aimed at remaining close to the neighbourhood 
level. Furthermore, the implementation of ward 
committees is intended to deepen local democracy, 
by calling for civics, residents associations, and willing 
individuals to work with the councillor, and help him 
liaise with his constituency. Complementing these 
participatory structures, a number of participatory 
mechanisms have been set up: participatory town 
planning through periodic Integrated Development 
Planning processes (Harrison, 2006; Ballard et al, 
2006), ideally amalgamating local needs into a 
metropolitan plan; ad hoc public or development 
forums often created around specific urban projects.
No matter how important the local democracy 
discourses and how various the participatory 
platforms, the most efficient forms of communi-
ties’ involvement into the management of their 
own environment are definitely not the institutional 
participatory channels, be it in the high- or low-
income areas. The ward system, for instance, has 
proved inefficient, compared to marches, riots and 
lawsuits, for residents to have their voice heard by the 
Johannesburg Council. This leads to what could be 
called ‘ruling by exception’, from a municipal point 
of view: including people’s concerns or demands into 
policy making at the municipal level happens as an 
exception and as a response to (media- or judiciary-
driven) urgency, much more than as the current 
management of daily affairs. People’s voices are taken 
into account only when they resort to exceptional 
means of expression, outside more regular, institu-
tionalised and routine participatory structures. In 
other words, participation is not part of the actual 
city governance structure, in spite of all local govern-
ment units and departments that actually (and not 
necessarily insincerely) use the term. I will illustrate 
this through two examples.
The first example examines residents’ participa-
tion in Johannesburg northern suburbs, around the 
issue of urban densification. While the Council (and 
partly the ward councillor, although she is from the 
DA) broadly encourages densification as part of its 
compact city strategy as well as economic growth and 
development, the residents are generally reluctant to 
see their green suburb being urbanised. Residents’ 
associations have started entering into negotiation 
with the Council, and a compromise seemed to have 
been found for a moderate densification, concen-
trated in specific areas. This compromise was reached 
thanks to the ward councillor and through different 
participatory mechanisms (IDP process; submissions 
of local layout and density plans to the Regional 
Spatial Development Framework, etc.). However, 
residents argue that many developers are given city 
permission to densify the suburb in contradiction 
with the framework: some associations then resort to 
judiciary action, “exiting” the political system to fight 
developers and municipal decisions in court. Whether 
successful or not, these lawsuits have shown property 
developers that they were being confronted by quite 
powerful residents associations: some of them, after 
having received approval from the Council, now 
directly approach residents associations to negotiate 
– the size and height of the building, its design – so 
as to make it acceptable to them and avoid long delay 
and legal costs.
The second example is even more striking in 
terms of the lack of responsiveness of municipal 
authorities when confronted with communities’ 
demands. In the late 1990s, one of the main issues 
that mobilised the residents of Eldorado Park, a 
former coloured township, was the problem of 
huge water and electricity arrears that led to service 
cuts and evictions. A group of lower middle-class 
residents, well informed about the legal and institu-
tional processes, attempted to be heard through 
the ‘normal’ way, in vain: they approached their 
(DA) councillor; wrote a letter to the Mayor, who 
sent them to the ward ANC branch; met the locally 
deployed ANC MP, who addressed them to the 
Mayoral Committee and Ministry of Housing – 
nothing. It is only when they resorted to marches 
and made noise in the media that they managed 
to get some municipal consideration, in a gradual 
process of scaling up the movement and learning 
new political skills. The originally small Eldorado 
Park extension 9 association indeed grew to form a 
civic in the whole of Eldorado Park, then created a 
broader civic uniting all former coloured townships 
in Johannesburg (claiming for the scrapping off of 
arrears “as in Soweto”); eventually they joined the 
big 2004 protest organised by the Anti-Privatisation 
Forum, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, 
and it was then that they were eventually granted 
a meeting with the Mayoral Committee. As the 
chairperson of the civic puts it, “it is only when you 
are radical that you are getting heard”.
These stories are only two amongst many, and 
they show a failure, or at least a structural problem, 
3 Each ward in Johannesburg represents approximately 15,000 registered voters.
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of institutional participatory mechanisms in the 
City of Johannesburg. The next step is to identify 
the obstacles to proper municipal responsiveness, 
through the study of decision-making processes 
within the City as well as the way one of the main 
participatory channels, the ward councillor system, 
actually works.
II.  Decision-making in the City, in a 
context of ANC dominance: limited 
power and accountability for ward 
councillors
Most analyses of local government failure to foster 
participation target the lack of training and political 
education, both of the councillors and of residents 
and groups of residents – challenged by the novelty of 
the ward system and the complexity of the multiple 
and sometimes overlapping platforms for participa-
tion. For instance, reports by IDASA (2001), DPLG-
GTZ (2005) and PLANACT (2005) emphasise the 
need for training and workshops to 
explain to the residents what their rights 
are in terms of participation, how local 
government works and what channels 
they should use to be heard. We argue 
here that even if it is partly the case, it 
is not the main reason for the dysfunc-
tional participatory system: the problem 
is much deeper and lies in the power 
structures of both the local city councils 
and of the national political setting. 
Indeed, two elements can be identified 
that explain the limits of participatory 
democracy:
- The limited power of councillors within the 
City council, due to a strong centralisation of 
decision-making and policy orientation;
- Their limited accountability to their constitu-
ency, due to the municipal structure itself, to 
the national electoral system, and to the South 
African and local political contexts.
1. Local councillors in Council have 
quite limited powers
The first and foremost limitation to participatory 
mechanisms in Johannesburg City Council is the 
very limited powers of ward councillors. Nobody 
has interest in advertising this fact (not the least 
ward councillors themselves), but it necessarily creates 
unattainable expectations, both from the residents 
(accusing their councillor of being “useless”) and from 
the other levels of government (relying on councillors 
for “delivery” as if they had a big say in it).
Firstly, Council decision-making is extremely 
centralised in the hands of the mayor and his ten 
members’ executive mayoral committee; at least as 
is the case in Johannesburg and Cape Town4. This 
system is efficient in providing a strong direction 
to municipal strategies and policies, personified by 
the Mayor. But on the other hand it is depriving the 
Council from its function of debate and delibera-
tion over urban strategies and policies. Although 
ward councillors can be heard by the Mayoral 
Committee, either in small working committees, in 
private discussion or through their party caucuses, 
this means more of a networking and lobbying way 
of participating in decision-making than a public 
one. In Johannesburg, this also obviously reinforces 
the “one-party dominance” (Southall, 2001), as the 
ability to influence and lobby an ANC mayoral 
committee is not evenly shared by all councillors 
– while a vote around issues could sometimes give 
opposition parties a meaningful role, even if they are 
not a very powerful minority in the Johannesburg 
Council. Instead, council meetings are mere political 
shows where the content of the debates matters less 
than the political stance taken by each councillor: this 
also provides in return very little room for construc-
tive opposition parties.
Secondly, the structure itself of this weak council 
is not conducive for ward councillors to actually 
represent their constituency. Indeed, council is 
structured into thematic, not geographic, commit-
tees5 (see figure 1). So far, headed by members of 
the Mayoral Committees, these thematic committees 
seem to have little decision-making power and little 
influence on urban policies: issues discussed deal 
more with implementation and bread and butter 
issues than with general orientation or debate on the 
municipal policy itself.
This choice (thematic, and not geographic, 
councillors’ working groups) can be partly explained 
by the fear of reproducing apartheid racial political 
territories (Cameron, 1999): administrative regions 
with limited powers, and no political entities, have 
Council meetings are 
mere political shows 
where the content of the 
debates matters less than 
the political stance taken 
by each councillor.
4  The Local Government Municipal Structures Act no 117 of 1998 offers the choice between two major systems for metropolitan councils: 
either a mayoral executive system (where the mayor is assisted by a strong mayoral committee nominated by him, i.e. not including
opposition parties: this gives him lot of power as well as to his political party, or coalition), or an executive system (elected by the council 
and therefore allowing for a representation of all political parties: this of course means a much weaker mayor, and a stronger council).
5  Until 2006, there used to be ten thematic committees and a few area-based committees (Inner City and Soweto).
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been set up to match ‘functional’ areas relying on pre-
existing identities or socially and racially homoge-
neous territories6. This has important repercussions 
in terms of local democracy. There are no public 
platforms where ward councillors can prioritise 
expenditures and needs per area – the grounding 
principle for Porto Alegre participatory governance, 
for instance. There are no platforms either where they 
can they express a specific local need or an increasing 
social tension requiring Council’s attention. Even the 
supposed mechanism for spatial representation and 
prioritisation, the Integrated Development Planning 
(IDP) process, in which the ward councillor and his/
her ward committee have an important role to play, 
is devoid of impact on decision-making and planning 
– its main limitation being the absence of budgeting 
associated with the priorities listed at the ward level; 
not to mention its other limitations, in terms of 
participation and understanding by even a selected 
few of the residents; in terms of real impact on policy 
orientations (Harrison, 2006; Ballard et al, 2006). As 
a result, nowhere in Council does the ward councillor 
actually represent his/her ward. 
This structure in Council increases the party’s 
power and control, over and above the council’s 
decision-making processes. Indeed, if for instance 
a ward councillor belongs to the Health committee 
but encounters, in his ward, major infrastructure 
problems, he can either report his concern to the 
Member of the Mayoral Committee in charge of 
the Infrastructure portfolio (which again depends 
on personal political networks), or he can bring 
the matter to the party caucus, where he can ask 
his fellow ward councillor (the one who sits on 
the Infrastructure Committee) to bring the matter 
forward on his behalf. This political route to raise 
a localised concern seems to be quite dysfunctional, 
and more often than not, ward needs and require-
ments are not taken from the bottom-up.
DA
Mixed
6  In Cape Town, this is different though, since there is a system of local sub-councils, where ward councillors of specific geographical area 
sit together in political entities. Precisely, these sub-councils are sometimes accused of reproducing the apartheid “Bantustans” as they 
are political structures designed around racially homogeneous territories (cf. Powel, A, 2006 “ANC, ID slam DA ‘Bantustan’ submission”, 
Cape Times, May 18).
Fig. 1 – Simplified Council structure and decision-making bodies in Johannesburg, 2005
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Johannesburg Council is not unaware of these 
difficulties, of course (Seedat, 2005). Centralisation 
of decision-making power and ANC control have 
been chosen over the need for democratic partic-
ipation in a time of post-apartheid reconstruc-
tion – after the crisis of the dual system model (a 
metropolitan government and powerful substruc-
tures) which contributed to the political and fiscal 
crises in the late 1990s. The latest restructuring of 
Johannesburg Council (mid 2006, still in process) 
is seeking to address some of the issues at stake; to 
foster participation and local representation, such as 
by giving the thematic committees an overseeing role 
(that remains to be defined); and by restructuring 
administrative regions (Soweto, which used to be 
split into two administrative regions will now fall 
under a single one). This might contribute in the 
longer term towards building a territorial platform 
where problems (and their hierarchy) are discussed at 
an area level. However, the limited power of regions 
can make this process quite lengthy, at best; ineffi-
cient, at worst.
2. Ward councillors lack, and do not 
look for, accountability to their 
voters
This lack of power is not an incentive for a strong 
accountability. Few councillors, knowing their 
powers are limited, dare confront their constitu-
ency especially when problems are rife. Few will 
either admit that their powers are limited, as it 
would destroy their prestige – unless they belong 
to an opposition party and can blame the ANC. 
Councillors will, rather than engaging with their 
potentially problematic constituency, use their only 
resource (information and network) at their discre-
tion to build some influence locally (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2006). Councillors’ accountability to their voters 
is further limited by two structural, interrelated 
elements: the South African electoral system, and 
South Africans’ current electoral practices.
Firstly, the electoral system emphasises the 
importance of the party in the choice of ward 
candidates (Cameron, 2006; Cherry, 2004; Darracq, 
2006). ANC branch members first choose their 
preferred ANC candidate for the ward: but this choice 
is discussed, and easily and commonly reversed at the 
zone and at the regional level within the ANC. While 
the ANC branch’s choice can reflect a candidate’s 
popularity or efficiency locally, the regional level will 
often propel candidates unknown locally, for other, 
often obscure or strategic reasons – but all related 
more to the place, power and political network of 
such a candidate within the party than to his/her 
embeddedness into a specific ward constituency. 
In this process, civic and community leaders are 
often sidelined in favour of candidates perceived 
as ‘outsiders’ and having very little knowledge or 
involvement in local issues – fostering local discon-
tent and often leading such activists to stand for other 
parties or as independent candidates.
Such a crucial role for the party (and not for 
the local party branch nor for the constituency) in 
the selection of ward candidates leads councillors to 
try and please their ANC hierarchy more than their 
constituency: the party’s, not the voters, satisfac-
tion will lead to a councillors’ re-election at the 
end of his/her mandate. For ANC councillors, it is 
therefore difficult, almost impossible, to ever criticise 
an ANC urban policy, principle or implementation. 
On the matter of privatisation of urban services 
in the townships, for instance, residents cannot 
rely on councillors to help them formalise obvious 
criticisms. The one Sowetan councillor who has 
tried, Trevor Ngwane, expressing his opposition to 
the council-led privatisation of water and electricity, 
has been expelled from the ANC7. In our case studies, 
it is not that councillors or ANC members do not 
see the hardship created by privatised water and 
electricity provision; but they cannot take a public 
stance against it. In Eldorado Park for instance, 
where government has just started installing a pre-
paid electricity system and where some residents 
individually express their financial incapacity to pay 
and livelihood disarray, an ANC branch executive 
member admitted: “Personally, I am not favour-
able to [the pre-paid system]; but… politically I am 
supporting it” (Interview, GW, 2006).
Secondly, ward councillors have little incentive to 
feel accountable to their local constituency because 
of political behaviours in South Africa, which have 
been explained more as a marker of identity than as a 
‘rational choice’ between various candidates, policies 
or programmes (Friedman, 2005). A bad-performing 
councillor may lead more to a decreased turnout 
pattern or to other signs of discontent and hopeless-
ness, than to a shift in the support for the party. The 
fact that residents vote for a party more than for a 
candidate however remains to be more thoroughly 
researched (Mattes, 2005; Fauvelle-Aymar, 2006), 
especially as it may change in time: observation of 
7  Freedom of Expression Institute, 1999, “Greater Johannesburg ANC suspends Pimville councillor Trevor Ngwane for publicly opposing
Igoli 2002 Plan,” 26 October.
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ward committee members’ elections can provide 
some thoughts in this regard (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006). 
One might also question the sense of causality: is it 
because voters support a party (no matter who the 
candidate or what his local programme is) that there 
is little attention to the choice of a locally legitimate/
accountable candidate, or is it because candidates 
are not debating on local issues but referring to their 
belonging party as their main electoral argument, that 
voters vote for the party more than the candidate? 
Eventually, one might find different patterns in more 
politically contested contexts.
Presently these two factors seriously limit the 
overall accountability of councillors towards their 
voters. Even ward committees have a low ability 
to challenge their councillor to make sure they 
are liasing in an appropriate manner between the 
Council and communities, or to access information 
on council policies or meetings. The ward commit-
tees’ mandate is officially limited, and if considered 
too obstructive, it can be easily sidelined by council-
lors. On the one hand, this limitation of ward 
committees’ power has its legitimacy – it gives the 
elected councillor (representative democracy) more 
power over a ward committee whose election ‘by 
the community’ remains prone to manipulation, as 
is often the case in participatory democracy. On the 
other hand, this may be a missed opportunity for 
enhancing councillors’ accountability towards their 
local basis.
Therefore, the lack of commitment of residents 
into ward committee meetings and participation 
processes is not very surprising: if ward committees 
are seen as powerless institutions, incentive to learn 
and develop this new approach to urban governance is 
low: in a functionalist vision, an efficient instrument 
for action usually does not take long to be recognised, 
seen and used. And indeed, the PLANACT report 
(2005) stresses two main criticisms expressed by ward 
committee members: their lack of clarity on instru-
ments for action, and their frustration regarding their 
lack of impact on council’s processes. On the ward 
councillors’ side, having a participatory approach to 
local development is obviously not entrenched in the 
urban government usual practice – but is there a real 
incentive to do that? We have shown this is not the 
case, especially for the ANC in the current municipal 
structure and political system.
Therefore, recommendations by agencies like 
GTZ, IDASA or PLANACT for the improvement of 
local democracy and ward committees, emphasising 
the role of ward committee members’ training, 
the need for public financial resources and the 
importance of an increased communication with 
Council, are only partly addressing the problem. The 
core of the problem lies in the power structures both 
within the party system and the council, much more 
than the lack of information and communication 
– but of course the former is far more difficult to 
address, and less politically correct.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that, in spite of the participa-
tion and decentralisation rhetoric, there is no real 
power vested at the local level. Participation is in 
practice considered a nuisance, be it through local 
elected representatives (who are given no real power), 
through projects ad hoc participatory platforms 
(often not taken very seriously), or through more 
informal interaction with local communities – as if 
they could only bring contest and arguments, and 
were in any case a waste of time and money. This 
contempt for participation is not an accident: it is 
rooted in both the municipal structure 
and in the electoral and party systems, 
aggravated in Johannesburg by the 
strong ANC dominance. Participation 
can be planned aside at each level of 
government; but is certainly not cast in 
policy-making, decisional structures or 
in urban projects’ implementation.
Why is participation so marginalised 
in the current ANC government and 
policy? The party tends on the contrary 
to increase its centralisation and concen-
tration of powers (Lodge, 2005), possibly 
a strategy to avoid confrontation and 
criticism; but is also, at a deeper level, a 
political choice for state efficiency and 
stability versus state accountability (Southall, 2001). 
Indeed, the needs for reconciliation, redistribution 
and social integration are huge and a full-fledged 
participation would probably endanger this aim – as 
participation can be parochial and conservative. It is 
all the more the case as the most powerful residents 
(who could use participatory mechanisms at their 
profit with the greatest efficiency) are in their majority 
supporting the opposition party. In Johannesburg, the 
desire of the City to keep the former white munici-
palities under control and to fight a DA constituency 
that has proved powerful in the transitional local 
government structure (1995-2000), is certainly an 
important explanation for the low profile of participa-
tory democracy in current ANC policies.
More generally, and going beyond South Africa, 
participatory democracy is a challenge to the power 
of the State – implying the sharing of decision-
Participation is in 
practice considered 
a nuisance, be it 
through local elected 
representatives or 
through more informal 
interaction with local 
communities.
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in the Brazilian context where the Labour Party used 
participatory democracy as a key issue in its political 
programme to win the support of the masses in a 
politically competitive context, and as a way to uproot 
traditional clientelist practices that were blocking the 
path to power (Guidry, 2003), the African National 
Congress has little obligation to relinquish some 
of its power, especially in Johannesburg where its 
political domination is uncontested. If some trends 
within the ANC were more sympathetic to grass-
roots democracy, following the legacy of the United 
Democratic Front (Seekings, 2000), this trend does 
not seem dominant within the ANC government. 
The recent call8 to revive the UDF as a means to 
foster a more powerful civil society that could pressu-
rise government to deliver and listen to the poor 
remains so far quite marginal, if not accompanied 
by a change in the structure of power at the local 
government level.
Ward councillors in this perspective are mere local 
social peace keepers – and their task will be more and 
more difficult as their powers remain limited in front 
of rising local discontent, whilst they are more and 
more presented by government as at the forefront of 
local delivery. Some are often caught between their 
possible sympathy for the needs expressed at the 
ward level on the one hand, and council policies and 
party directions on the other9. One of their growing 
avenues for action is the use of individual clientelism 
– not achieving much in terms of collective good but 
fragmenting or diffusing discontent by distributing 
some resources to well selected leaders. This might 
be partly efficient to maintain social peace, but has 
certain effects on political practices and cultures 
– corruption and contempt for politics seen as a way 
of accessing resources on an individual basis, more 
than a way of addressing collective rights.
8  By the Western Cape branch of COSATU, and by the ANC (although in vaguer terms, calling for the creation of a “broad front” in civil 
society).
9  As apparent in the recent measure taken by the eThekwini municipality, urging its councillors not to encourage land invasion and shack 
development: Mthembu, B, 2006, “Municipality signs pledge over land: Councillors ‘encouraging mushrooming of shacks,’” Daily News,
November 1st.
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